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"As the end of the twentieth century draws closer," Akbar Ahmed and Cris Shore write, "it is becoming increasingly apparent that the world is changing, not just incrementally but also qualitatively. Human societies are moving into a new phase of history " (1995a:12) . Thus opens an extended reflection on sociocultural anthropology in the contemporary world-a world, social theorists are now wont to tell us, that is characterized by time-space compression, deindustrialization, and intensifying identity politics (see, e.g., Giddens 1990 , Appadurai 1996 , Hannerz 1996 . New phenomena, hitherto conspicuously absent in most ethnographies, are said to pose unprecedented challenges to anthropological research practice, particularly the tradition of long-term and localized fieldwork. The anthropologist's analytical language comes to highlight social and cultural ruptures. At issue is a move which merges anthropology with a discourse on modernity, a discourse that has been constitutive, in its arguments for and against the assumed "modernity," of the discipline of sociology. We examine the abstractions this move demands for ethnographic analysis. On the basis of our fieldwork in Melanesia and Africa, we give brief examples of how a current metanarrative of modernity organizes ethnography and, with its specific emphasis on ruptures, obstructs the production of anthropological knowledge.
The current fin-de-siè cle angst differs from the critique of ethnography in the 1980s. The influential "literary turn," in which the problems of ethnography were seen as largely textual and their solutions as lying in experimental writing (see Clifford and Marcus 1986), seems to have lost its impetus. Its assault on "realist" ethnography was too categorical, its view of different currents in the history of ethnography lacking in nuance (Fox 1991a:5) . The subjectivist agenda, moreover, was too obviously an inversion of perceived scientific objectivism to offer a plausible alternative (Grimshaw and Hart 1995: 59) . In the 1990s, major volumes assessing current challenges to sociocultural anthropology focus on relevance rather than representation (see, e.g., Fox 1991b , Ahmed and Shore 1995b , Moore 1996a , James, Hockney, and Dawson 1997 . The reflexivity of the 1980s debate is now largely taken for granted, whereas its subjectivism is replaced by a sense of ruptures in the real world and the concomitant need for new methodologies. The quest for relevance has its political edge, though hardly inspiring the self-criticism of the decolonization period (cf. Hymes 1972 , Asad 1973 . Instead, relevance calls into question anthropology's own identity politics. It would appear that for anthropologists writing today the decentering of Western knowledge claims is now done most effectively by "postcolonial" or "Third World" cultural critics in metropolitan academia who, by virtue of personal diasporic experiences, have the insights that others must undertake fieldwork to gain (see, e.g., Spivak 1988 , Bhabha 1994 . Fearful of being forever associated with the esoteric, some anthropologists embrace, with their discourses on "modernity," these postcolonial critics and the social sciences at large.
Tellingly, the volume on the future of anthropology which begins with Ahmed and Shore's prophetic words ends with an equally bold judgment by a sociologist, Anthony Giddens. His verdict on anthropology is grim: "A discipline which deals with an evaporating subjectmatter, staking claim to a method which it shares with the rest of the social sciences anyway, and deficient in its core theoretical traditions " (1995:274) . He does go on to concede that the world at the dawn of the 21st century poses no less difficult challenges for sociology. A key reason is sociology's long-standing commitment to analytical models which equate societies with nationstates. Globalization and the transnational flows of institutions, ideas, and capital are rapidly undermining such models and encouraging sociologists to interrogate the analytical category of society (see, e.g., Martin and Beittel 1998, Touraine 1998; for an earlier discussion, see Moore 1966) . The parallel to anthropologists' fears of parochialism is clear. Ethnography, Arjun Appadurai says, "must redefine itself as that practice of representation that illuminates the power of large-scale, imagined life possibilities over specific life trajectories " (1996:55) . The mass media, especially the electronic media, are important vehicles in effecting the enlargement of the imagination which makes the ethnography of specific, localized relations seem to him parochial.
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A fortunate collapse of disciplinary boundaries in the social sciences would seem to ensue, a long-awaited response to difficulties which have evoked much criticism (see, e.g., Wallerstein 1991 and 1998). Our insistence upon the uniqueness of the ethnographic method goes against this current of convergence. This should not be taken to indicate anthropological chauvinism. Ethnography, in the sense we use the term here, entails revision of analytical perspectives on the basis of reflexive living in another setting, a research practice that is not necessarily confined to sociocultural anthropology (for a classic nonanthropologist 's ethnography, see, e.g., Willis 1977) . Nor do we oppose anthropologists' attempts to "think big"-to engage in public debates and to offer syntheses of historical and ethnographic materials (see, e.g., Wolf 1982 , Tilly 1984 . The issue of scale is critical, however. Anthropologists writing about modernity are often highly aware of scale, but their claims to control analytical scales-in references to "larger-scale perspectives" or "wider contexts"-bypass valuable and still underdeveloped knowledge practices in ethnography. They 2. The anthropological parallel to sociologists' reflections on the concept of society is, of course, a critique of the concept of culture. The methodological and epistemological issues in the disconnection between "culture" and locality are highly challenging, and we do not wish to dispute the value of the innovative work that these problems currently inspire (e.g., Fog Olwig and Hastrup 1997, Gupta and Ferguson 1997) . Nor do we dispute the value of studies which focus on the uses of "culture" as strategies of exclusion and empowerment in current identity politics (e.g., Sahlins 1993 , Turner 1993 , Friedman 1994 , Wolf 1994 , Stolcke 1995 , Ong 1996a . Our concern with modernity's meta-narratives in ethnographic analysis is linked to these bodies of work only indirectly, insofar as the notion of "cultural diversity" in a current discourse on modernity sustains the concept of discrete cultures.
do so by organizing their ethnography in a meta-narrative which makes shifts in scale look natural.
We use the term "meta-narrative" to mean a set of organizing assumptions of which only some may be enunciated in a given anthropological narrative. The assumptions surrounding "modernity" often perform their analytical work in ethnographies through such meta-narratives rather than through explicit propositions. Instead of engaging in explicit theorizing, anthropologists often rely on ethnography as the means of making an empirical contribution to the social scientific debate on modernity. This is how, at least in part, precious relevance is seen to be regained in the discipline. Daniel Miller's prediction in 1994 that his ethnography of modernity "is likely to be one of several over the next few years which are explicitly concerned with comparative modernities, based in non-European contexts " (1994:68) , has proven to have been rather perceptive.
These contributions, we must clarify, by no means expound one coherent notion of modernity. "Modernity" has become a buzzword to such an extent that we must distinguish a meta-narrative from the word and make it clear from the outset that our focus is on the former. The word "modernity" may or may not carry a metanarrative. For example, it can simply mean "contemporaneity," surprising especially nonanthropologists, as in the intriguing expression "the modernity of witchcraft" (see Geschiere 1997) . Profound difficulties follow, however, when "modernity" comes to delineate a condition of existence and to merge the concerns of ethnography with those of Western sociology. Although the result may be little more than an account riddled with tautology (Englund 1996) , it is, above all, the extent of ethnographic ignorance in the perspectives organized by modernity's meta-narratives that concerns us here.
Current anthropological sensibilities have little patience for a discourse on modernity in the singular. Instead, a notion of multiple modernities appears plausible. We begin by exploring this notion, asking whether its assumptions differ significantly from those of earlier notions of modernity. Our intent is not to establish whether one notion of modernity represents an advance over another but to highlight how modifications retain key aspects of earlier meta-narratives. Our critique revolves around certain specific abstractions in the current discourse on modernity and, in particular, around the concept of the person that those abstractions involve. Our ethnography from Papua New Guinea on current interests in white people, money, and consumption interrogates "commodification" and "moral panic" and our ethnography from Malawi on born-again Christianity "tradition" and "individualization." Our alternative perspective on personhood and sociality both arises from a conceptual critique and is nuanced by lived experience during fieldwork. We insist, in other words, on ethnography as a practice of reflexive knowledge production, not on an empiricist critique based on unmediated experience. The knowledge practices of ethnography, we conclude, are unique in that they give the ethnographer's interlocutors a measure of authority in producing an une n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 227 derstanding of their life-worlds. We end by reflecting not only on the limits of the meta-narratives of modernity in returning relevance to sociocultural anthropology but also on the contemporary conditions of academic work that undermine the knowledge practices of ethnography and render such meta-narratives plausible.
The Sociological Legacy multiple modernities
Ambivalence, the uneasy wavering between hope and despair, is an enduring principle in Western social thought. Its source is arguably the Judeo-Christian cosmology of human imperfection, qualifying even the optimism of the 18th century (see Sahlins 1996) . The history of anthropology can be seen as a progression through a series of meta-narratives, some of which are founded on this ambivalence. Marshall Sahlins's Culture and Practical Reason (1976) , for example, exposed two abstractions which derived from such meta-narratives: the imperfect means-ends relation among individuals and the ecological factors which determined or constrained the social order. However, the belief that it is possible to have a perspective without any preconceptions is difficult to sustain in anthropology after the critiques of ethnography in the 1980s. Our concern in this article is not, therefore, with the general fact that there are metanarratives but with the specific abstractions that the meta-narratives of modernity entail. We examine the extent to which ethnographic knowledge practices can sustain a critique of those abstractions. We begin, though, with the specific history of social thought which generates the assumptions of personhood and discontinuity we go on to dispute through our ethnography.
The emergence of sociology at the turn of the 20th century introduced ambivalence as a key theme in a discourse on modernity. Sociology broke with the spirit of the Enlightenment; it was "born pessimistic" (Touraine 1995:129) . The celebration of "modernization" in the mid-20th century appears, with hindsight, unvarnished in its optimism, although not even the modernization theorists spoke with one voice (cf. Eisenstadt 1992; Smelser 1992:380). Talcott Parsons's (1967 Parsons's ( , 1971 ) notions of functionally specific institutions and generalized values invited the conceptualization of domination and conflict (Coser 1956 , Dahrendorf 1959 and their incorporation into functionalism as "breakdowns" in modernization (Eisenstadt 1964) . Much earlier, Emile Durkheim (1933 Durkheim ( , 1952 and Max Weber (1958) had already written the specter of a countertendency into their understandings of modern society, differentiation and rationalization breeding anomie and the "disenchantement of the world" (Weber 1958:155) . While some would regard the extent of pessimism in these perspectives as a moot point (on Weber, see, e.g., Seidman 1983 , Weiss 1987 , their ambivalence over the imagined "modern" condition is, at any rate, palpable. They indicate, moreover, a "double hermeneutic" in which, according to Giddens, "sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of social life " (1990:15, emphasis omitted) . In other words, the ambivalence over modernity that Durkheim and Weber, among others, expressed was intrinsic to the worldview of self-consciously "modern" subjects and, in turn, nourished that worldview with further sociological thoughts.
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Toward the end of the 20th century, a sociological sense of "the darker side of modernity" (Giddens 1990: 7) is, if anything, even more pronounced. Environmental problems and the nuclear threat are now seen as some of the pressing issues which the founders of sociology did not envisage (cf. Beck 1992 and 1997). The different viewpoints in the current "double hermeneutic" are united by deepening disenchantement. This, Wendy Brown observes, "is not so much nihilism-the oxymoronic belief in meaninglessness-as barely masked despair about the meanings and events that humans have generated" (1995:26) . In moral thought, disagreements and even doubt about the possibility of common criteria are now seen to be so pervasive that they undermine comprehension and morality (see, e.g., MacIntyre 1981 and Horton and Mendus 1994; McMylor 1994) . Whatever one's standpoint on these issues, and even if one chooses to define the current condition as "postmodernity," the meta-narrative of ruptures, of sociocultural discontinuities, remains intact (Harvey 1989:117) .
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It organizes, as ever in the discourse on modernity, the ways in which relevant research questions are identified and their potential answers circumscribed.
Diversity is a key notion in this superabundance of meaning, of conflict and controversy, and it accords well with late-20th-century anthropological sensibilities. Even outside anthropology, it has become common to enunciate the "dialectics of modernity" (e.g., Tiryakian 1992 , Therborn 1996 . The idea of countertendencies continues to animate scholarly debate, with disenchantement and differentiation, for example, serving as a background for the contemplation of "reenchantment" and "dedifferentiation" (Tiryakian 1992). Scholars complicate their own disenchantment by observing that re-3. The impact of the arts, for and against modernity, has also been great in this deepening self-consciousness (see Bell 1978 , Berman 1983 . Among intellectuals, the Frankfurt School has represented probably the most concentrated effort to expound the ills of modernity (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Jay 1973; Touraine 1995: 151-64) . 4. Attempts to move "beyond" modernity merit a comment. Postwar modernization theory raised doubts about the distinction between "tradition" and "modernity" which was constitutive of the perspective itself (Bendix 1967 , Tipps 1973 . A more comprehensive assault on the foundations of modernity has been associated with the rise of postmodernism (for overviews, see Vattimo 1988 , Harvey 1989 , Turner 1990 , Bauman 1992 . Its emergence in anthropology during the 1980s received, lone voices notwithstanding (notably Tyler 1986), a lukewarm if not hostile reception (see, e.g., Sangren 1988 , Pool 1991 . In the 1990s, major volumes assessing the state of sociocultural anthropology routinely mention in their introductory chapters the contribution that postmodernism has made to anthropologists' own reflexivity but proceed to denounce its selfdefeating political and epistemological relativism (see, e.g., Fox 1991a:5-9; Ahmed and Shore 1995a:40; Moore 1996b:2-3).
ligious beliefs thrive as much as ever and that even those who specifically reject religion can find new sources of enchantment in the fantasy that technology, movies, and intercontinental travel, among other things, seem to offer. But it is important to bear in mind that such fantasies represent "reenchantment" only after self-consciously "modern" subjects have defined "disenchantment" as one of modernity's key features.
Intrinsic to the current meta-narrative is the idea that "dialectics" constitute the contemporary world as a universe of multiple modernities (see, e.g., Pred and Watts 1992 , Comaroff and Comaroff 1993 , Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995 , Friedman and Carrier 1996 , van der Veer 1996 , Ram and Jolly 1998 , Behrend and Luig 1999 . Three important assumptions are usually made explicit. The first is that modernity, full-fledged and recognizable, is everywhere. This assumption precludes teleology; some parts of the world are not somehow less modern than others. The second is that the institutional configuration of modernity cannot be defined in advance. The analyst may choose to highlight witchcraft in one setting, aesthetics in another, and political economy in a third, but through the abstractions of "reenchantment" and "dedifferentiation," for example, they all are so many illustrations of particular modernities. The third is that diverse cultures persist, offering, according to some perspectives, "local" responses to "global" processes. Current accounts rarely pose a choice between hope and despair. "Dialectics" provides the analyst with a meta-narrative of both "creative opportunities" and "threat and danger" (see Geschiere and Meyer 1998:606) .
The rhetoric of ethnographic holism takes on a new guise, now as a necessity to "situate" apparently discrete cultures and societies in "wider contexts" (cf. Thornton 1988; Marcus 1998:33-56) . The new holism of multiple modernities highlights "diversity within interconnectedness" (Hannerz 1996:55) , cultural specificity which owes its emergence to "expansive markets and mass media . . . commoditization and crusading creeds . . . books and bureaucracies" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993:xiii) . The new holism, which simultaneously celebrates cultural diversity and resists parochialism (cf. Geschiere and Meyer 1998), places emphasis on variation. However, it cannot obliterate the logical requirement of representing variation against something that is invariable.
5 The rest 5. Consider Cyril Black's observation, expressed in the analytical language of his times but with implications that are curiously current: "The situations faced by modernizing societies are universal, even though the solutions will more often than not be unique for each society " (1966:164) . The observation calls for analyses of particular societies, because modernization assumes multiple forms. Sidney Mintz finds the notions of current changes in Africa and Bronislaw Malinowski's (1945) "theory" of cultural change "eerily similar " (1998:120) . In his discussion of some current notions of cultural diversity, Jonathan Friedman (1994:208-10) has observed that the notions of "creolization" and "hybridization" convey an image of pure or original traits mixing to produce new forms. Ulf Hannerz (1996:67), a proponent of the "creolization" concept, has vigorously denied the charge, finding further parallels in linguistic creolization, which does not presume that creoles derive from a source that is itself historically pure. This response, in turn, seems to ignore Friedman's (1994:209) acknowledgment that many major of this article considers some of the abstractions which are taken to define the invariable ruptures brought about by modernity in its multiple refractions.
modernity and the person
The concept of the person provides a revealing perspective on the specific abstractions of the current metanarrative. Much follows from the way in which personhood is apprehended, such as the notions of property and morality which underlie the persuasive abstraction of "commodification" in the meta-narrative of multiple modernities. We do not propose an alternative "theory" of personhood. Instead, we compare sociological and anthropological concepts of the person in the study of modernity and show how, despite anthropologists' suspicion of the "individual" as a cross-cultural notion, some are inclined to forget the ethnographic record when they contemplate modernity's ruptures. A practice of reflexive knowledge production, in turn, defines our alternative to the meta-narratives of modernity, a practice in which the possibilities of an analytical-cum-descriptive language are explored both in scholarly critique and in the fieldworker's lived experience. Reflexivity in our account therefore lies less in devising theoretical propositions than in producing new anthropological knowledge in the very attempt at making a meta-narrative explicit. Studies of modernity continue to identify it with a set of personal dispositions, from ways of perceiving, expressing, and valuing (Inkeles and Smith 1974) to a "reflexive project" in which self-identity becomes a central object in personal narrative and practice (Giddens 1991). For some sociologists, the individual as a particular sociocultural project merges, almost imperceptibly, with an analytical category. Roland Robertson, for example, is not only interested in documenting how "'modern man'-and increasingly 'modern woman'-has become a globally meaningful notion" (1992:184); he also insists that "individuals are as much a part of the globalization process as any other basic category of social-theoretical discourse" (1992:104). The "individual," in other words, is not only a consequence of modernity but an analytical construct of timeless validity. Giddens could scarcely be more explicit about the accompanying analytical dichotomies: "Self-identity becomes problematic in modernity in a way which contrasts with self-society relations in more traditional contexts " (1991:34) . If persons are individuals, then there must be societies which put them in relations with one another and cultures which supply them with repertoires of meaning. The analyst may choose to highlight modernity from the viewpoint of individual experiences or that of "whole" societies and cultures. Such dichotomies are integral to the concept of the person as an individual and to the contemplation of modernity's ruptures. To be sure, an-"natural" languages are indeed products of the same processes and that therefore the theoretical value of the creolization concept is contested in linguistics.
e n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 229 thropologists have long been more eager than sociologists to acknowledge that the "individual" may be an ethnocentric notion of personhood. In recent anthropology, one alternative is to invoke specific cultural others in order to arrive at a notion of dividual persons (Strathern 1988) . Yet when juxtaposition is understood to render contrasting notions incommensurable rather than versions of one another, such an alternative merely invites somewhat contradictory accusations of essentialism and relativism (see, e.g., Josephides 1991, LiPuma 1998). Against that, runs the current anthropological wisdom, all persons are both dividuals and individuals, and ethnography comes to highlight how "individuality is central to modernity not only conceptually but as the locus of the forms of desire that define the modern" (LiPuma 1998:76) . The meta-narrative of multiple modernities, in other words, furnishes the ethnographer with a sense of the direction which the universal dividual-individual tension will take.
Once a meta-narrative of modernity is understood to organize ethnography, its critique can draw upon a whole range of alternatives in the intellectual legacy anthropologists generally think with. Consider, for example, the notion of internal relations which has long confronted individualistic notions of the person in Western philosophy (for an overview, see Ollman 1971:27-42). Rather than being external to the person, social relationships are here imagined as internal to its being. The person is a composite, an embodiment of others' contributions. A corollary is a certain blurring of subjectobject relations and a difficulty in viewing property as a resource attached to particular individuals. Moreover, human beings are not the only loci of relationships; material objects may be similarly personified.
Consider also, with this philosophical alternative in mind, the notion of personhood that emerges from ethnographies of unmistakably late-20th-century cultural realities-new reproductive technologies (e.g., Strathern 1992a, Franklin 1997, Konrad 1998). When their body parts and procreative substances derive from multiple sources, persons appear as composites. This invites corresponding revisions in the concept of property, particularly in litigation. In their attempts to imagine the need for such revisions, Euro-Americans may well be inspired by anthropological studies of the concept of the person in Melanesia (see Strathern 1998). They need not, however, be confined to just one ethnographic region in their quest for comparative insight. The ethnographic record shows how material and immaterial agencies -divinities, animals, plants-have variously constituted persons under widely different historical conditions. As Henrietta Moore argues, "the idea that the modern world is producing individuals who are no longer fully human, that modernity attacks the completeness of the person, is misleading if we are trying to suggest that people in other times and places have been simply fully human " (1996b:8) . The effect of consulting the ethnographic record would be to render new reproductive technologies and cultural "others" coeval (see Fabian 1983) , partners in the production of social knowledges.
The meta-narratives of modernity, by contrast, would envisage in technological innovation a rupture of a specific kind. It is a rupture in the orders of meaning, a transition to "biosociality" or a "cyberculture" in which previous distinctions between nature and culture, humans and machines, face a perplexing collapse (see, e.g., Rabinow 1992, Escobar 1994). The familiar imagery of novelty and crisis underlies these accounts (cf. Franklin 1995:178) , and for some anthropologists the consequences are quite dramatic. Moral panic is seen to accompany discourses on human cloning, the traffic in body parts, witches' use of zombies, and so on. 6 An issue in these discourses, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff claim, is "a fear of the creeping commodification of life itself which erodes the inalienable humanity of persons, rendering them susceptible as never before to the reach of the market" (1998).
The imagery of "creeping commodification" is evocative, suggesting modernity's inexorability and a culturally specific fantasy with sinister undertones. Our discussion of the concept of the person enables us to discern a highly implausible meta-narrative of modernity in such claims about the effects of generalized commodification. The assumption that persons carry "inalienable humanity" is enough to situate the Comaroffs' perspective in the ethnocentric legacy of social scientific discourses on modernity. Ethnographic inquiry, we argue, must be conducted in full awareness of this legacy-of its adverse effects on attempts to appreciate social life in specific historical conditions. Fear there may well be, even more likely argument and ambiguity, but we should not presume to know what that fear is about, what its "real" sources and referents are, however much the social sciences supply us with ideas about modernity and the person.
A critique based on existing philosophical and ethnographic scholarship is, however, only one step in reflexive knowledge production. We subscribe to a tradition of realist ethnography in which fieldwork as lived experience is indispensable for the production of anthropological knowledge. One hallmark of that tradition, though rarely sufficiently realized, is that ethnographers allow their own selves to be transformed in the process of inquiry (Davies 1999:24) . Wherever it may take place, anthropological fieldwork regularly sends the ethnographer into situations that are beyond his or her control, imposes interlocutors' concerns and interests upon the ethnographer, and challenges the perceptual faculties the ethnographer is accustomed to trust (cf. van Dijk and Pels 1996) . It is the necessity to translate this experience from one domain of "representations" into another (Sperber 1996) which carries the potential for new knowledge about both domains. While we acknowledge the unsa-6. As an analytical term, "moral panic" means not mass hysteria but the emergence of social movements to counter perceived threats to fundamental values. It is revealing that Jean La Fontaine (1998:22) should criticize Peter Jenkins (1992) for neglecting the question of "meaning" in moral panics. It is one thing to identify the issue in a moral panic, another to understand its relation to other issues in a given setting. vory history of realist claims in the imperialist representations of cultural "others" (cf. Said 1993), it should not deter us from allowing realist ethnography to make its unique contribution to the social sciences. The fact that ethnographic writing often eclipses the lived experience of fieldwork is less an argument against realism than a reflection of conventions and power relations (cf. Jackson 1989 , Stoller 1997 .
In the two ethnographic cases that follow, we have chosen to report our own experiences as white European males not to indulge in "I-witnessing" (see Geertz 1988: 73-101) but to show how bodily, emotional, and intellectual quandaries merge during anthropological fieldwork. Our cases highlight anxieties and practices which address the "modern" condition. In our case from a Papua New Guinean periphery, villagers appear to be distressed by money and new forms of consumption. In the capital of Malawi, born-again Christians appear to be rejecting "tradition" in order to embrace modern individuality. Although we may be aware that a meta-narrative makes these instances appear as persuasive examples of multiple modernities, no amount of conceptual critique enables us to anticipate the specific content of our interlocutors' concerns. For all our appreciation of dividual selves and unexamined meta-narratives before we commenced our fieldwork, we had preconceptions of what white people stood for in these two postcolonial situations. A challenge deriving from lived experience during fieldwork forced us to reconsider these preconceptions and spurred the above critique in theoretical terms.
Knowing White People's Wealth interrogating the ethnographer
During his fieldwork in villages along the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea in 1994-95, 7 Leach was often asked questions about white people and the origins of money. After some months, new stories of "liver thieves" (man stilim leva) gave an alarming edge to these questions. The stories, widespread along the coast at that time, claimed that raskols (criminals, often youths) led by a white man were patrolling the coast in a high-powered dinghy, capturing local people traveling in boats and killing them in order to remove their livers and other internal organs for sale overseas. As the reports multiplied over the next few weeks they became more elaborate: The police had captured the white man's briefcase with plans of attacks and ambushes inside; there were sightings of white people leaving the airport in Madang (the 7. Fieldwork was undertaken mainly in the Mot 1 census district, and it is the people resident in this area to whom we refer as "Rai Coast villagers." Tok pisin, the lingua franca of Papua New Guinea and widely used along the Rai Coast, is indicated by italics. Words in the vernacular of the people Leach worked with, Nekgini, are shown in square brackets where appropriate. Leach gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Economic and Social Research Council (U.K.) for his research. local town) with suitcases covered in newspaper and swarming with flies. Leach was made aware of the effect of these narratives when, on one trip he made along the coast, people in the village of Warai scattered into the bush on his arrival. An old man who had been welcoming on previous visits approached cautiously, asking accusingly, "What are your people up to? We are afraid now" (Ol lain bilong yu wokim wanem? Mipela pret nau).
Questions about alternatives to the national currency were a more persistent undercurrent to Rai Coast villagers' interest in Leach's presence. In a tale which preceded a particularly vigorous interrogation, some villagers were said to have gone to Madang to sell copra. Instead of the usual cash, in return they had received a check for "triple-six money" (tripela-sikis moni), which they duly collected from an "office" (opis). The condition of receipt was that at some later date the "owner" (papa) of this money would come to put his "number" (namba; see Robbins 1997a:49) on their scalps and demand a return. Refusal would result in death. Assuming that selling one's soul would bring a higher price than selling copra, Leach was surprised to discover that his questions about the quantities of the money involved seemed irrelevant to his interlocutors. Instead, a series of questions was directed to him: Did he know of this kind of money? Where did it come from? Who was the origin (owner) of this kind of money? Would it replace the national currency, and when could they expect this to happen? The story was clearly told at the time it was, in Leach's presence, so that answers to such questions could be elicited from him.
Evidence from elsewhere in Papua New Guinea shows that similar narratives are fairly widespread (see, e.g., Robbins 1997a, b; Wood 1995). They demonstrate that interrogation goes both ways in the fieldwork situation. When modernity's meta-narrative comes to organize ethnography, the content of such questions may appear selfevident. It may easily be viewed as reflecting Papua New Guineans' anxiety about their place in globalization. The story of liver thieves, for example, seems a particularly forceful statement of "the use of the bodies of some for the empowerment of others" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). The danger is, however, that ethnographic observations other than the narratives themselves become redundant. To avoid this danger it is necessary to study more closely Rai Coast villagers' notions of wealth and personhood. There is more to the separation between locals and white people than meets the eye.
For villagers, the Rai Coast is las ples, the "last place" to receive development and change. With some self-deprecating irony, they relate a story about Peter Barter, the local provincial member of parliament. Flown in by helicopter to campaign in the district in 1993, Barter uttered "Good night, Rai Coast" as his opening words. Spoken in broad daylight, these words were intended to convey the "darkness" of underdevelopment. Part of this perception is borne out in fact. The position of the Rai Coast, hedged in behind by the steep Finisterre Range and crosscut along its length by swift rivers, makes road transport difficult. Year-round access is only by light aire n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 231 craft or sea. Furthermore, Rai Coast people have a reputation for resisting or subverting attempts to develop the area (see Lawrence 1964 , Morauta 1974 . These obstacles have not left the area untouched by colonial and postcolonial influence, however. Missionaries worked along the coast in the 1930s, and in their wake came plantation owners. Many men worked in the plantations at one time or another, went farther afield to the gold mines at Bulolo in Morobe Province, or worked as cooks and carriers for colonial officials and entrepreneurs.
At present, the plantation economy has all but collapsed, and most villagers rely for access to cash on a small number of kin who are employed in towns. Cash is essential to purchase bush knives and clothes and to pay school fees. It also changes hands in bride compensation, but it cannot wholly replace other forms of wealth, such as pigs, shell wealth, dogs' teeth, and wooden objects. In contrast to these other items, Rai Coast villagers say, money is too easily frittered away. People "eat money" (kaikai moni), and there is little expectation of a return for the money that is lent to others for business projects. Cash crops evoke only sporadic interest, and cash is sometimes denied to be a suitable substitute for other forms of wealth. Difficult to utilize for productive exchange relations, money is closely associated with white people. Its ubiquity raises the question of what could constitute a productive relationship with white people or among white people themselves. Rai Coast villagers expected that Leach would be able to answer such questions. The way in which they were asked, however, put him on entirely the wrong track.
white people, the dead, and affines
In another encounter a deeply personal narrative started to unravel the complex connections Rai Coast villagers were attempting to make in their queries about money and white people. When visiting the hamlet of Sarangama toward the end of his fieldwork, Leach was approached by one of his acquaintances, an old man we will call Pereng. On this occasion Pereng made much of the fact that he was an old man and had many worries. Too old to visit his gardens any more, all he could do, he claimed, was to sit at home and brood. His two wives had both died and left him. As Leach began to commiserate over this tale of bereavement and old age, the old man told Leach that compounding his loss was a dream. In that dream, his first wife had come to him bringing a bag full of money. She had told him that this was his money; it was meant for him. But then the dream had ended, and he had awakened with nothing. He continued:
This, James, is what makes me so unhappy, so sad.
And this is what I think about in my house every day. Why did she take my money? When am I going to get it? . . . I know, James, that you know where my money is, and you can get it for me. I know that you have ways of getting money from the graveyard, that you must stand strong on the grave at night. But it is all right, I realize I am not supposed to mention this; the secret is safe with me. I know this is the tambaran [secret/cult knowledge] of white people, hidden from us in Papua New Guinea. I want you to help me and to get my money for me. After all, why did she show it to me if it was not meant for me?
These kinds of requests were a regular feature of Leach's time on the Rai Coast. They always made him uncomfortable, because he felt that his response could never satisfy his interlocutor. Moreover, he was vaguely frightened by all this talk of the dead and graves. It appeared that white people were sinister figures in the local cosmology. At issue was perhaps a critique of globalization and colonialism, a critique that tacitly situated Leach at its sharp end. But with some distance, and therefore less discomfort, the issues in the interaction between Pereng and Leach appear more clearly. Pereng's intent, we argue, was to elicit a response from Leach which would change his feelings of bereavement and ineffectiveness in the world. Pereng wondered whether Leach was willing to link his project with Pereng's own.
Pereng's dream appears to be about loss. A loss of one kind (wives) is compounded by a loss of another kind (money). In the uncomfortable position of feeling obliged to deny knowledge of where his money was, the ethnographer began to view the old man as manipulating him. In the immediacy of the discomfort, he failed to reflect on the limits to his own understanding of money and death. The substitution of persons for wealth, especially women-as-wives for wealth, is consistent with quotidian practice along the Rai Coast. An active and powerful man has relations with affines. It is through these relations that wealth comes to the man and new persons, most obviously children, are generated.
The association in Pereng's narrative is not merely between wives and wealth but between dead wives and white people's wealth-money. The dead, and by extension white people, appear analogous to, or linked with, affines, the source by which wealth comes to the man. It is the final factor in the narrative, the tambaran, which indicates what Pereng understood to be the context of the request. The tambaran is a male spirit cult, but in contrast to the situation in other areas of the north coast (see Tuzin 1980), women also have a form of tambaran. Tambaran [kaap] in the villages where Leach conducted fieldwork indicates a technology of exchange with the ancestors. Tambaran is not merely the designation of a cult but a generic term for the modes of communication people have with the spirits of places and ancestors, the agencies by which people are able to achieve the growth of their crops and children. 8. As these observations suggest, tambaran (with its original in the vernacular [kaap] ) is a polysemic term. The spirits with which the male cult is concerned are called tambaran [kaapu] , the men of the cult when gathered together are known collectively as tambaran [kaapu] , and the ritual paraphernalia are also known as tambaran [kaapu] . The spirits which ensure the growth of children in the One needs the tambaran to manage one's communications with the dead and to provide necessary regulation and distance. The dead are, like affines, beings with whom one can have productive relations if managed correctly, but both the dead and affines are dangerous. The dead cause sickness, death, and famine. Affines present another threat. No marriage occurs on the Rai Coast without a confrontation between the future relatives. It is said that a man will always fight the man who has caused his sister to fall in love with him. Her desire to be with this man is all the evidence a man needs to conclude that she and by extension he himself have been done great violence through love magic (Harrison 1993: 122; Leach 1997:117) . In other words, relations between affines, like those between the dead and the living, are tense and potentially destructive. Affines constantly demand respect and deference in order to encourage the growth of children (see Wagner 1967) . At the same time, relations between affines are absolutely necessary to the continuation of social life, to a productive future.
Pereng's imagination is directed to discovering the tambaran of white people. How do they grow their form of wealth, money? What connection does it have to their dead? The emerging association is not surprising. Far from personifying individuality (see LiPuma 1998:72), white people are another group of ambiguous beings, obviously powerful and obviously with wealth to exchange. It makes sense to think of whites as versions of the dead-capricious at times, hard to establish the right relations with, but potentially extremely important exchange partners. Money in Pereng's narrative is not, therefore, a negation of exchange relations or a good in its own right. Villagers on the Rai Coast have an interest in making money analogous to wealth of other kinds-wealth that is both exchangeable for persons and a trace of the relationships between distinct realms or groups of beings, just as bride compensation is. Pereng's assumption is that, for white people, money plays this role.
The fear conveyed in Rai Coast villagers' queries and narratives thus may not be as it first appears. Their fear is not "moral panic," sudden anxiety over extraordinary assaults on the moral order. It is the fear that one rightly has of the dead or of one's affines-and all unknown people are potential affines. Fear arises from passions integral to productive relationships. All wealth, all productivity, comes from tense and dangerous relationships, whether they are predicated on the separation of affines from one another through love magic and the ensuing confrontation, negotiation, and settlement (marriage) or on the violent separation of the dead from the living. For Rai Coast villagers, every instance of death is the responsibility of hostile others. Pereng says that white people must be strong when they wait on a grave for money. If one is not strong, if one is afraid, one will not receive womb, along with the moment of childbirth, are called "women's tambaran" [kaapu pareing]. The ritual cycle to which these spirits are central is, in short, the source of a residential group's appearance of power and agency. the reward of money. This is the same language as used by the initiators of boys into the cult of the tambaran; their strength will bring them the reward of manhood.
productive relations: relations of separation As do people in many other settings in Melanesia (see, e.g., Burridge 1960, Kirsch n.d., Wood 1995), Rai Coast villagers often say that white people and their cargo (kago, material wealth) originated in their lands. The Rai Coast version is unusual in that it focuses on the separation as a necessary precondition for the creation of the wealth thus lost. In a myth, two brothers fight over a woman who is a "sister" to them both. The elder brother eventually expels the younger, marrying the woman. The younger brother leaves with what eventually becomes white people's cargo, but not before he has instigated the practice of exchange with the man who used to be his brother, now, by definition, his affine.
More than just a story about the origin of white people, the myth describes the beginning of social life itself. Prior to this, the narrative makes clear, there were no marriages, no exchanges, and no children. The fight separated kin and made their position as affines plausible. In claiming agency in creating difference, Rai Coast people claim agency in white people's productivity. They also envisage a productive recombination along the lines of marriage and exchange. According to local wisdom, one does not "eat oneself" (ne naki) or one's own produce. In other words, one does not marry one's kin. Marriages balance a loss of kin with the products of another place-substitutes, in the form of wealth and produce which can be consumed, for the body, which cannot. Money, as mentioned, has an ambiguous position in such exchanges. At times it simply disappears, leaving no trace of a relationship, whereas a pig that is given away brings respect and tangibly affects others' growth and well-being. When white people, separated from Rai Coast villagers so that exchange may commence, return with their money, the local project is to accept it as an exchange item on a par with more established wealth.
The stories about triple-six money and liver thieves are examples of such attempts to determine what exchange with white people entails. As in the case of Leach's interaction with Pereng, fear and intimations of satanic forces must be fully investigated. In their stories about triple-six money, Rai Coast villagers give their own context to their queries. The context is the national currency, a form of wealth without an owner or a clear origin with whom exchange can be envisaged. In imagining triple-six money, there is an attempt to establish relationships through wealth that indeed has an identifiable origin. Crucially, the biblical allusion to the devil demands an appreciation of the Rai Coast's specific historical context rather than of capitalism in general (pace Taussig 1980; see also Turner 1986, Parry and Bloch 1989). As a consequence of the upheavals on the Rai Coast led by Yali Singina (Lawrence 1964 , Kempf 1996 , villagers had driven the missionaries out by the 1950s. Tired of being e n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 233 condemned for using hunting magic and respecting ancestors, they were not afraid of being called satan. During Leach's fieldwork they happily said that they were satan because they had not been baptized or because they used spirit names to assist planting their crops. Association with the biblical devil, in other words, was not necessarily moral opprobrium. "Satan" was simply one of the contrivances of white people which needed to be probed further.
In a similar vein, wherever the stories of organ extraction may originate and whatever their truth value elsewhere, they assume specific content in the context of Rai Coast villagers' notions of relatedness and white people. Such stories represent white people not as monsters but precisely as people who want something that local people can provide (cf. Strathern 1992b). The desire for organs mirrors Rai Coast villagers' own desire for a relationship of exchange and incorporation. Writing about Kamula in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea, Michael Wood (1995:32) provides insights which are suggestive also for the Rai Coast:
In these accounts the creation of difference between whites and Kamula is presented as a consequence of a flow of entities and powers out of the Kamula domain. The narratives, while in part blaming Kamula ancestors for the current global situation, also set up the terms for a partial or complete restitution of the loss. Indeed within the terms of these narratives the process of colonialism can be understood as the first phase of realizing this restitution.
In ethnography organized by modernity's meta-narrative, colonialism would hardly appear as the first phase of restitution. Nor would violence and extraction appear as preconditions of productivity. Rai Coast villagers' views of liver thieves resonate not only with their understanding that violent separation is necessary to marriage but also with the cannibalism that affinity is seen to entail. The loss of a woman is compensated by a pig which is eaten by her kin. As their narratives suggest, before pigs had assumed their place as "bodies" in bride compensation, the first-born was sent to the mother's brothers, who would "eat" the young child in recompense for their loss. As potential affines, white people may require similar acts of cannibalism. Far from being involved in a contentious moral argument, Rai Coast villagers interpret through their stories the fact of relatedness. Their ethnographer must bear the burden of accepting them as partners in envisaging human sociality. Modernity's metanarrative would make at least two crucial observations redundant. One is that bodies do not belong to persons as possessive individuals. The other is that productive relationships are predicated on violence and extraction.
Passions of Born-Again Christianity pentecostalism and modernity's metanarratives
From a Papua New Guinean periphery our focus moves to a capital city in southern Africa, a region known for its long and tumultuous history of slave trade, international labor migration, political turmoil, and religious pluralism. Malawi, a landlocked country of some 10 million people, has been a particularly important source of male labor for South African mines during both colonial and postcolonial times. This form of labor migration was abruptly ended by the Malawian government in the early 1970s. Many returned to smallholder agriculture, but migration to plantations and urban areas within the country became important for both men and women. Rural-urban migration among the poor is largely circulatory, with periods in town interspersed with visits to villages. The building of Lilongwe as the new capital in the 1970s has made it the fastest-growing city in this predominantly rural country. The continuing expansion of its poorest areas, such as Chinsapo township, indicates that urban amenities fail to increase at the pace of migration to the city.
In his attempt to study the complex religious and healing practices in this impoverished township in 1996-97, Englund was inevitably drawn to Pentecostal churches. Pentecostalism, perhaps the most organized form of the wider movement of born-again Christianity, has an assertive presence in the township through several churches, active preaching even outside the churches, and a lifestyle said to be different from that of those who have not been "born again" (obadwa mwatsopano in Chichewa). In contrast to the Rai Coast villagers described above, Pentecostal Christians in Chinsapo township seem to have domesticated the habits of white people. They not only put much emphasis on appearance, on smart suits and immaculate dresses, and on the virtues of monogamy but also vigorously reject "black people's medicine" (mankhwala achikuda) in favor of "white people's medicine" (mankhwala achizungu). They categorically condemn all "traditional" healers (asing'anga).
Pentecostalism, an apparent example of Protestant fundamentalism (see Gifford 1991 , Martin 1991 , would seem to provide a particularly vivid perspective on modernity. The experience of being "born again," for example, seems to sever the bonds of kinship. The Pentecostal way of life appears to be at variance with the obligations associated with the extended family, and Pentecostalism can provide persons with a sense of heightened individuality which justifies at least a partial withdrawal from those obligations (see Meyer 1995 Meyer , 1998a . Moreover, Pentecostal Christians in urban Africa may be seen to use the abstraction of "tradition" and to insist on a "firm rejection of village culture" (van Dijk 1992:159) , where "the village" becomes the site and symbol of evil, rife with immoral traditional customs, witchcraft, and other evil powers (van Dijk 1992:166-69; cf. van Dijk 1995 van Dijk , 1998 . At issue appears to be an effort to reject one's past in order to achieve a "second birth." 9 Individualization, seen by one anthropologist as aspiring to "the ideal of the modern person who is fully in control of herself" (Meyer 1998b:202) , would seem to underlie this effort. Thus Pentecostalism appears to be a way of negotiating the dichotomies-individual vs. society, traditional vs. modern-which define the experience of modernity.
Just as the imitation of European conduct and dress in southern African towns under colonialism was not such an act of submission as it seemed to some (see Mitchell 1956 , Magubane 1971 , Kapferer 1995 , so too specific cases of contemporary Pentecostalism may be ill-understood in terms of a meta-narrative of modernity. For Englund the uncomfortable experience of being observed by Pentecostal congregations rather than accepted as a "participant observer" began to unravel these complexities. No Pentecostal Christian Englund met would accept that an impartial anthropological interest drove him to participate in Pentecostal services or to have casual conversations on questions of belief. He had to have a personal thirst for "the words of God" (mawu a Mulungu).
At first, recalling the widespread notion among Malawians that every white person is a practicing Christian, Englund assumed that his appearance in churches aroused interest because a white person was seen to bring them prestige and recognition. In other words, if whites were quintessential Christians, then the appearance of a white man in the church could only endorse the spiritual maturity of the whole congregation. However, as the desire among many Pentecostal Christians to "teach" (kuphunzitsa) him did not abate, this assumption became less plausible. Uneasily concealing the fact that he had not belonged to any denomination for over ten years, Englund worked hard to show interest in and some knowledge of the intricacies of the Bible. The revelation that he was not a Christian would, he thought, have unduly disturbed his Pentecostal interlocutors. At the same time, the more time he spent with Pentecostal Christians the more he realized that, for all their penchant for "modern" attire, they by no means associated the born-again condition with white people or with a particular class. Some township residents had, as watchmen and domestic servants, ample evidence of the deplorable habits of whites in the city. Moreover, as is discussed below, Pentecostal Christians in Chinsapo township emphasize the gospel of "security" (chitetezo) more than prosperity. Rather than taking them to represent Pentecostal Christians in general, let alone a desire to be "modern individuals," the ethnographer must appreciate their specific existential passions.
9. For Birgit Meyer (1998b:183) , the concerns among Ghanaian Pentecostal Christians accord with those formulated by one of the foremost theorists of modernity, Jü rgen Habermas (1987). They illustrate Habermas's dictum that "a present that understands itself from the horizon of the modern age as the actuality of the most recent period has to recapitulate the break brought about with the past as a continuous renewal" (1987:7).
healing and morality
The response of Pentecostal Christians to Englund's illness during fieldwork made apparent their view of personhood. Several volunteered to pray for Englund but also observed that he could be healed only if he "admitted" (kuvomereza) that the Holy Spirit (Mzimu Woyera) guided his life. This requirement leaves little chance for the born-again Christian to be "fully in control of herself" (Meyer 1998b:202) . A similar, though morally opposite, view of agency underlies the abstraction of "black people's medicine." Despite being aware that much "black people's medicine" is based on knowledge of various plants and animals, Pentecostal Christians view its practitioners as people possessed by evil spirits (ziwanda) sent by Satan (Satana). At the same time, "white people's medicine," far from being sufficient in itself, often follows (or its effect is thought to be reinforced by) the laying of hands on the afflicted and intense praying in which "in the name of Jesus" (mu dzina la Yesu) is chanted. Pentecostal Christians' interest in Englund resembles their interest in all the others in the church-do they, as persons, belong to the realm of God or that of Satan? These observations, in turn, call for a closer look at Pentecostal Christians' preoccupation with healing. Does "black people's medicine" signify "tradition" or "village culture"? Is "individualization" at issue when a person is constituted by Satan or God?
Healing (machiritso) is often the most time-consuming activity for Pentecostal pastors in Chinsapo township. Toward the end of the sermon, the afflicted are asked to come to the front of the church, where the pastor and his assistants lay their hands on them and pray. More than half of the congregation usually answers the call. Successful pastors are also distinguished by a steady flow of people at their houses, looking for prayers that will heal their afflictions or help them to fulfil their aspirations-from employment to happy domestic life. A pastor may receive some dozen visitors every day and is expected to attend to their troubles with equal fervor whether they are members of his church or not. During Englund's fieldwork the pastor of a major Pentecostal church was evicted by his congregation precisely because he was seen to be an inadequate healer. Returning from a funeral in his home district, he found that the congregation had hired a lorry and removed his property to the church headquarters.
Given this emphasis on healing in the quest for security, the virtual obsession of Chinsapo's Pentecostal Christians with "black people's medicine" comes as no surprise. Satan's work under the guise of healing must be made explicit in order to discover the realm of God. In practice, however, the realms are situationally defined, and the existential weight of a particular affliction may be too daunting to permit denominational rigor. In one case, a young woman had long suffered from insomnia and various somatic ailments after her boyfriend had abandoned her. A "traditional" healer (sing'anga) gave her medicine which was meant to release her by inflicting her troubles on him. At the same time, however, she began attending a Pentecostal church, where her participation in intense praying, singing, and dancing soon gave her sound sleep and ended the other ailments. Convinced that God had released her, she disposed of the medicine in front of the congregation. In this case, the vigorous physical engagement with problems in the company of a whole congregation stood in a sharp contrast to the lonely manipulation of murky medicine.
The abstraction of "black people's medicine" is not a step on the way to further abstractions such as "tradition" or "village culture." Inspired and guided by Satan, the practitioners of "black people's medicine" are ubiquitous, found everywhere from the wealthiest suburbs to the poorest villages. A great uncertainty often permeates the life-worlds of Chinsapo's Pentecostal Christians, casting doubt on the morality even of members of one's own congregation. This uncertainty accounts for the fact that the devil cannot be unambiguously localized. Chinsapo's Pentecostal lay preachers and pastors often say that they prefer non-Pentecostal congregations in villages to those in towns, but this is less because of concern about the fundamental immorality of village life than because of the difficulty of getting their message heard in town. Preaching in urban markets or on street corners, it is said, is often interrupted by insolent passersby who call one mad (openga). Perhaps worse, it may be simply ignored. In villages, by contrast, an attentive audience, eager to learn through listening and discussion, 10 is usually guaranteed.
Even though the devil is not a localized notion, mudzi, the term for both "home" and "village," has deep moral connotations among born-again Christians no less than other residents of the township. Material considerations are inseparable from this moral sentiment. Chinsapo is a setting where the modernist narrative of permanent urbanization does not apply (cf. Ferguson 1990 and Macmillan 1993 and . Most Chinsapo residents, both women and men, move between village and town several times during their life cycles, and cultivation in the village is often a necessary supplement to their meager urban incomes. As a moral sentiment, mudzi is not merely a place but a set of relationships, a site of solicitude which is not necessarily spatially demarcated. In the township, "people from home" (anthu a ku mudzi) may not be related through kinship and may even hail from a different village or a different chiefdom, but they are sources and subjects of trust, welfare, and mutual support. Access to land, moreover, extends mudzi to a 10. Among the residents of Chinsapo township, Pentecostal churches are not distinguished by differences in their gospel, and indeed a distinction between rural-and urban-based churches is rarely recognized. Any such distinction is blurred even further by the practice of "planting churches" (kubzala mipingo), where a town-based church or mission helps a new pastor to establish a church in his or her area of origin. Church leaders in town often view "natives" of specific areas, because of their example and intimate knowledge of the local setting, as the best persons to spread the gospel. For aspiring pastors in the township, scraping up a living through petty business or underpaid employment, the prospect of returning "home" to lead a congregation is likewise highly attractive. particular place. "When things get difficult we shall return" (zikadzabvuta tidzabwerera) is an oft-heard phrase in the township, evoking an image of a localized haven which, whilst certainly poor, defines the ultimate "home." united in the blood of jesus If "black people's medicine" does not condense "tradition" and "village culture" into one neat formula, then perhaps the abstract individual, another postulate of modernity's meta-narrative, could organize ethnography on Pentecostalism in Chinsapo township? A brief comparison of personhood in "black people's medicine" and in Pentecostalism reveals the two, once again, to be phenomena of the same life-world. Both appear to emphasize personal experience not as an individual's revelation but as a composite of spiritual and human agencies. The path which leads to becoming a healer is paved with affliction caused by earlier personal misbehavior or by the spirit of a deceased relative (mzimu). In the former case, the power to heal is gradually acquired by accepting a spirit from God, usually called the Holy Spirit, as one's guide; in the latter case, the same occurs through an ancestral spirit. Likewise in Pentecostalism affliction or personal immorality precede the "second birth" whereby the person receives the Holy Spirit. Although there is much dispute between healers and born-again Christians over the rightful claim to be possessed by the Holy Spirit, their similar cosmologies of the composite person make the dispute mutually intelligible. The abstract individual in an unmediated relation to God would entail an irreconcilable discontinuity in cosmology.
The discontinuity that does emerge in the second birth separates the person from those who have not been born again, but it does so by reconstituting the person in other social relationships. In the most prosaic sense, the Pentecostal congregation consists of "relatives in the Spirit" (azibale a mu Uzimu), persons who call one another "brother" and "sister" and who engage in mutual support. This conjoining of persons in the Holy Spirit is, moreover, an embodied condition (cf. Csordas 1994). The blood that Jesus shed runs in the veins of every spiritual brother or sister. "Protected by the blood of Jesus" (otetezedwa ndi mwazi wa Yesu), the person cannot be harmed "because of the blood of Jesus which is in his or her body" (chifukwa cha mwazi wa Yesu amene ali mkati mu thupi mwake). The afflicted become healed when they are "anointed with the power of the Holy Spirit" (odzozedwa ndi mphamvu ya Mzimu Woyera).
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The Holy Spirit is, in brief, "in him or her" (mwa iye). United in the blood of Jesus, the bodies of Pentecostal Christians are corporeal signs of composite selves.
Uncertainty, as we have said, haunts even bornagain Christians. The interest that Englund's appear-ance in Pentecostal churches aroused greets every stranger. Englund was not taken for granted as a Christian, nor was the desire to teach him a simple effort to convert. Rather, he was under observation so that the relationships which constituted him as a person could be established. The congregation can always have those who only fake born-again ecstasy, from one's neighbor on the church bench to the pastor who is leading the sermon. Satan's presence among the born-again is especially disturbing, albeit not thought to be uncommon. Just as the protection and security that the Holy Spirit provides is embodied, so is satanic influence. When witches are directly addressed by pastors who lay their hands on them, their hearts begin to beat violently; they cry, fall down, and may start speaking in incomprehensible languages which some mistake for the tongues of born-again Christians. Persons under Satan's influence also begin to feel uncomfortable when the congregation is singing and dancing; they feel hot, want to get out, and often begin to cry. A person does not have to be a self-conscious witch in order to be discovered a subject of Satan. On the contrary, the experiences of cleansing that often accompany the process of being "born again" gain their force from the realization that the person had been constituted by evil spirits all along. The evil spirit can be an ancestral spirit, proof that the dead person himself or herself was under the influence of Satan. Persons constituted by the Holy Spirit "sleep" (kugona) after death rather than afflicting their living relatives.
Ethnography organized by modernity's meta-narrative would contain some of the observations mentioned above, but it would cast them in a mold that would leave most observations redundant. Belief in the healing powers of the Holy Spirit and in the evil nature of "black people's medicine," for example, would be interpreted as part of the global countermovement against "disenchantment." In this interpretation, it would not necessarily be the ethnographer who regarded "black people's medicine" as "tradition" and Pentecostalism as "modernity"; rather, township residents' own arguments would be seen to revolve around this dichotomy. The interpretation would be guided by a pre-given meta-narrative rather than close attention to the interaction between the ethnographer and his or her interlocutors in the production of anthropological knowledge. The observations above indicate the potential for ethnographic ignorance in accounts organized by modernity's metanarrative. The tradition-modernity dichotomy, for instance, obscures the shared cosmology in the moral disputes between healers and born-again Christians, the abstraction of individualization makes it difficult to appreciate the embodiment of human and spiritual relationships, and so on.
Modernity's Meta-narratives and the Knowledge Practices of Ethnography creating contexts
It is important to be clear on the debate we are addressing with our ethnography, because the evocation of multiple modernities can have at least two broadly contrasting analytical uses. One deploys "multiple modernities" for purposes of contrast, "to make a critical point," as George Marcus and Michael Fischer (1986:162) explain. The strategy serves to defamiliarize phenomena which have been taken to be examples of Western modernity. It is, however, potentially ethnocentric both in its assumption of the "West" as the prototype of modernity and in its use of "others" for cultural critique "at home"; "what is at stake is our modernity (and view of the world), not theirs" (Ong 1996b:61). Less ethnocentric is, apparently, the other use of "multiple modernities," the focus of this article. Here the issue of scale, the aforementioned need to "situate" the local and the particular in "wider" contexts, is critical. Anthropologists, Appadurai argues, can no longer "assume that as they approach the local they approach something more elementary, more contingent, and thus more real than life seen in larger-scale perspectives" (1996:54). The implication is that a wider context, Appadurai's "larger-scale perspective," yields more knowledge about a narrower context than the focus on the latter context itself. "Modernity" is a trope that links the shifts in contexts together.
A laudable effort to distinguish one's perspective from other available notions of an interconnected world, such as world-system theory (Wallerstein 1974 (Wallerstein , 1980 (Wallerstein , 1989 and the sociology of modernity in the singular (Giddens 1990 (Giddens , 1991 , often underlies this approach (see, e.g., Robertson 1992, Geschiere and Meyer 1998). By the same token, the notion of multiple modernities creates its own context for social scientific argument. It preempts that argument by offering its own analytical alternatives and representing them as little short of repugnant: the parochialism of particularism and the ethnocentrism of modernity in the singular. As a consequence, the Comaroffs' "ethnography of the middle-range," which is "neither unambiguously local nor obviously global" (1998), is, within the terms of the argument, reassuringly sensible.
The gist of our ethnography is to remind us of the anthropological insight that the ethnographer can never assume prior knowledge of the contexts of people's concerns. While neither a Papua New Guinean periphery nor a Malawian township has been spared the effects of transnational regimes of exploitation, our discussion shows how anxieties over money, violence, the devil, and healing provide, if probed more closely, their own contexts for ethnographic understanding. From the analogy between the dead, affines, and whites to the constitution of all persons by spirits, the "wider context" is not for the ethnographer to determine. Nor is it to be discovered through unmediated experience, as if ethnographic une n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 237 derstanding preceded the concepts in which it is communicated. Like the "new old realism" which Marcus (1998:40) has identified in the kind of holism criticized here, our realism presumes that the ethnographic world is knowable only in the language that the ethnographer has at his or her disposal. However, our realist ethnography is reflexive; it uses the ethnographer's lived experience, with due attention to its discomforts and afflictions, to explore the possibilities and limits of that language.
12 Taken in this sense, comparison is implicit in all ethnography.
A meta-narrative, not an effort to make the reflexive production of anthropological knowledge explicit, organizes ethnographic writing in the discourse on multiple modernities. The notion that modernity, in its multiple forms, does not represent a definite "sociohistorical break" (Comaroff 1994a:303) is hardly plausible if it is still assumed that culturally specific concerns transform "translocal discourses into local vocabularies of cause and effect" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). Far more intriguing is ethnography which seeks to avoid a sense of rupture by showing, for example, how in north-western Tanzania sorcerers are thought to be quite as capable of operating in the world of money as cosmopolitan businessmen are able to engage in traffic in blood and corpses (see Weiss 1998). Here, the stories of blood sale and extraction prompt the ethnographer to delve into a nuanced study of blood as a substance and resource among Haya. Although the reader is treated to a wealth of detail, and although the ethnographer is able to make an ingenious analogy between the Haya understandings of blood and commodity circulation, "commodification" introduces an unacknowledged meta-narrative into the ethnographic analysis. Because it is unacknowledged, the ethnographer fails to reflect on the seeming compatibility between Haya concerns and the social scientific understanding of what "commodification" entails.
Perhaps the most fatal difficulty in the current metanarrative is its ill-theorized relativism. The analysis of multiple modernities against the backdrop of commodification, nationalism, Christian missions, and so on, bespeaks a view of modernity's historical origins in the "West," and even a proponent of cultural diversity in globalization locates the origins in the period of the decline of feudalism in Europe (see Robertson 1992:182) . Relativism derives from the attempt to avoid naive belief in diffusion from a core to a periphery. Cultural diversity and juxtaposition imply, it is argued, that the actual location of the emergence of modernity was the colonies, not the metropolis (cf. King 1995:113-14) . Anthropologists now see colonialism, in effect, as a process of struggle and negotiation rather than as progress or exploitation (Pels 1997). Quick to sense the danger of Euro-12. This emphasis on the lived experience of the ethnographer as a situated subject likens our perspective to the "standpoint epistemologies" of some feminist theorists (for a discussion, see Denzin 1997:53-89) . While the interest in lived experience has often remained abstract in their work, our case studies have indicated how it is through lived experience that assumptions in ethnographic writing come to be exposed. centrism, some anthropologists, such as the Comaroffs (e.g., 1993:xxviii), go even farther by insisting that contemporary Western modernity is no less "magical" than modernities elsewhere. From its stock markets to its lotteries, Western modernity has a "single common denominator" with other modernities in "the magical allure of making money out of nothing" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1998). "We are all equal," Miller adds, "when it comes to the bizarre world of re-enchanted commodities" (1994: 313).
13 Even more, witchcraft beliefs elsewhere are said to find parallels in the contemporary Euro-American moral panics over the abuse, satanic or otherwise, of children (see Comaroff 1994b, La Fontaine 1998).
Taken together, two observations prove the ultimate illogicality of the current meta-narrative. First, shifts in context are offered as ways in which the true conditions, if not the causes, of cultural practices can be apprehended. This comes dangerously close to regarding those practices (witchcraft, for example) as "mystification." Idioms which are documented in ethnographies become "local vocabularies of cause and effect" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1998) in the predicament anthropologists have defined for various cultural others. Second, whatever the appeal for cultural diversity in the notion of multiple modernities, it seems that anthropologists themselves are outside culture altogether. How else could one explain their capacity to step in and out of contexts at will, to gloss any culture, including the Western or the EuroAmerican, as "magical"?
This illogicality, mixing analytical high-handedness with trendy relativism, marks the demise of reflexivity. It should be clear that it is not the analytical interest in context that troubles us; shifts in context routinely produce knowledge (cf. Duranti and Goodwin 1992, Strathern 1995, Howard-Malverde 1997, Dilley 1999). However, the need to shift contexts that accompanies the latest meta-narrative of modernity obscures, indeed mystifies, the production of anthropological knowledge itself. The knowledge claims specific to anthropologists studying multiple modernities create, unreflexively, an epistemological vacuum in which the "wider context" inadvertently represents the anthropologist's own superior understanding of the world. Unwittingly, anthropologists follow the analytical procedure whereby, in Moore's words, "Western social science consistently repositions itself as the original point of comparative and generalizing theory " (1996b:3) .
between field and factory
The meta-narrative of modernity which currently appears to be the most plausible, that of multiple modernities, is a response to analytical problems which sociologists and sociocultural anthropologists have long 13. The magical nature of commodities is an old idea which has required little anthropological insight to emerge. One source is in Karl Marx 's work, and Walter Benjamin (1983) and Raymond Williams (1980), among others, have more recently publicized it outside anthropology. created for themselves. The idea of rupture has always accompanied the notion of the "modern" society, and the social scientific preoccupation with modernity of course antedates anthropologists' misgivings about the representation of "primitive" and "isolated" communities. Taken together, the notions of modernity and cultural difference seem to offer a convenient solution to the problems of both representation and relevance. The indeterminacy of modernity's institutional and ideological framework permits a celebration of diversity in ethnographic accounts. The very notion of modernity, in turn, provides the "wider context" of a transnational, even global, predicament.
Although we would not want to block any scholarly pursuit, we insist that the uniqueness of the ethnographic method is at stake in the current fascination with multiple modernities. Studies of multiple modernities celebrate diversity against their authors' understandings of the similarity underlying or even generating that diversity. Sociocultural anthropology merges into cultural studies and cultural sociology, and ethnographic analyses become illustrations consumed by metropolitan theorists. An implication is, as we mentioned at the outset, that our difficulty lies less with a word than with an unexamined meta-narrative. It would be most unfortunate if anthropologists learnt only to erase the word "modernity" from their accounts without confronting the persuasiveness of the accompanying meta-narrative.
At the same time, as we have suggested, anthropologists are obliged to rethink comparison in ethnographic writing. Our ethnography on the anxieties over money and consumption in the case from Papua New Guinea, for example, will be seen to present an instance of "decommodification" only if Rai Coast villagers' own concerns are obscured. Theirs is an investigative disposition, an effort to make sense of the wealth that seems so crucial to white people. Because Rai Coast villagers do not presume that this wealth has a commodified form among white people, they can hardly be concerned to "decommodify" it. However, the abstraction of "commodification"-like "individualization" in the Malawi caselooms large in our own account precisely because most readers of our ethnography are able to understand those concerns and practices only in relation to what they are not. Every act of ethnographic writing is, explicitly or implicitly, an act of comparison, because the ethnographer has no choice but to write in relation to what his or her readers can be assumed to know already. The fundamental difficulty of the meta-narratives of modernity lies in their inability to make the ethnographer's predicament explicit. Instead, they eclipse the lived experience of fieldwork and make "modernity" and the abstractions associated with it natural foundations for comparison.
Could our argument be seen to resist development in anthropological fieldwork methods? The time-space compression effected by transnational travel and the electronic media appears to transform the nature of fieldwork, if not to displace it altogether as a key anthropological practice (see, e.g., Appadurai 1996, Hannerz 1996, Clifford 1997). We are not, once again, arguing against innovations in anthropological practice such as multisited ethnography, which, as Marcus (1998:94-95) acknowledges, has antecedents in anthropology before the current discourse on modernity and globalization. However, we find unwarranted the conclusion that longterm and localized fieldwork has had its day. The conclusion caricatures ethnography by implying that its substance can be reduced to what occurs in the course of fieldwork in a particular locality. The focus on particular relationships is, rather, a basis for ethnographic imagination to transcend the confines of the particular. In other words, intimate knowledge of a particular setting, through which flow many currents, provides a standpoint from which to address issues of scale in a way that generalizing perspectives do not.
If the current critique of fieldwork arises in response to "empirical changes in the world" (Marcus 1998:80), anthropologists can hardly boast much control over the pressures that those changes exert on their own practice. To do so would be to uphold the illusion of anthropologists as "independent craftsmen" (Fox 1991a:8), free from the factory conditions of contemporary academic work. In this regard, James Clifford's critique of the "legacies of exoticist fieldwork" (1997:90) is in itself an illuminating case of self-justifying craftsmanship. Fieldwork in anthropology, Clifford observes in now distressingly conventional terms, "is sedimented with a disciplinary history, and it continues to function as a rite of passage and marker of professionalism" (1997:61). The emergence of cultural studies provokes renewed assertions of this disciplinary specialty, to the detriment of, in Clifford's view, research practices more attuned to traveling than to dwelling as a critical contemporary condition. It is only in passing that he pays attention to material constraints as factors beyond interdisciplinary competition in Anglo-American academia currently undermining fieldwork, arguing (1997:90) that declining levels of funding are forcing anthropologists to shift from long-term fieldwork abroad to short visits or to sites closer to "home."
Given the relatively limited requirements of most field projects in sociocultural anthropology, the problem of funding does not represent the biggest threat to the ethnographic method. More fundamental are the "factory conditions" and "audit practices" which now structure academic work as a whole, particularly in Anglo-American academia (see Strathern 1997, Shore and Wright 1998). The constant monitoring of scholarly output, in quantitative at least as much as in qualitative terms, feeds the proliferation of journals, book series, conferences, and workshops, all of which presuppose continuous presence in academia. Reflection-a slow and unpredictable activity by its very nature-fits uneasily with the logic of auditing. Under such conditions, the doctoral project is becoming the only period of sustained and longterm fieldwork in a scholarly career. Unsurprisingly, perspectives which require a minimum of fieldwork, perspectives which demand instant ethnography to e n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 239 illustrate aspects of a metropolitan meta-narrative, hold increasing appeal.
During the past three decades, the call of reflexive and critical anthropology has been for awareness of power relations in both fieldwork and academic institutions (e.g., Scholte 1972). However, whereas much of this criticism has sought to decolonize anthropology, academic auditing makes anthropologists inadvertently participate in the undermining of their own knowledge practices. While decolonization remains to be accomplished, new pressures may require a new reflexive anthropology. It must confront the quest for relevance when the corollary of relevance is ethnographic ignorance. It must also confront cynicism about "a rite of passage and professional marker" (Clifford 1997:61) when cynicism justifies a virtual disengagement from those parts of the world which, quite emphatically, are not well linked to the forces of time-space compression, such as the electronic media and mass tourism. When social scientists explore the new phenomena that global capital helps to create, it is important that the assumption of an inexorable force be thoroughly interrogated.
Throughout this article, a new reflexive anthropology has appeared as a renewal of the discipline's old concerns. We have insisted upon the uniqueness of the ethnographic method in the repertoire of contemporary social scientists. At its best, it allows the subjects of research to participate in the production of anthropological knowledge by indicating the contexts which are relevant to their own practices and by interrogating basic analytical notions such as the concept of the person. Thus stated, our position renews the anthropological tradition of treating with suspicion the ideas and practices which are current in the anthropologist's own immediate world. 
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Englund and Leach have two principal concerns in their article. The first is to alert anthropologists to the way in which a particular widely adopted theoretical orientation-the meta-narrative of multiple modernities-and its associated conceptual vocabulary are tending to replace genuine theoretical inquiry grounded in ethnographic research. Their second and, they believe, related concern is that dependence on this meta-narrative is seriously undermining "anthropological research practice, particularly the tradition of long-term and localized fieldwork." The meta-narrative supporting the concept of multiple modernities, with its apparent celebration of diversity, is particularly appealing for anthropologists. However, this discourse tacitly assumes a universal modernity that is rooted in its concern with fundamental ruptures, or discontinuities, in sociocultural forms held to accompany modernity. Thus ethnographies from within this meta-narrative are seen to espouse a new holism in that they simply provide empirical examples of surface variation in aspects of modernity such as "commodification" and "individualization," which represent some of "the invariable ruptures brought about by modernity in its multiple refractions." In such ethnographies, the meta-narrative takes over the work of theorizing, essentially acting as an explanatory gloss that is imported and placed on ethnographic observations rather than as a theoretical construct grounded in them. This outcome derives in large part from ethnographers' insufficient reflexivity regarding the specificity to Western social thought of the constructs of multiple modernities and globalization and their consequent failure to problematize these concepts and investigate-rather than assume-their applicability to their own research settings. I have argued elsewhere (Davies 1999) that a thoroughgoing reflexivity which operates at various levels, including that of the ethnographer's broader intellectual context, is integral to good research and can be pursued from within a critical realist epistemology without succumbing to a radical reflexive cycle of increasing self-absorption. The authors provide examples from their own research which accomplish precisely this: While recognizing the necessity to address current theoretical perspectives of modernity and globalization, they demonstrate how a more reflexive use of this theoretical base can lead to alternative explanations and conclude that "the ethnographer can never assume prior knowledge of the contexts of people's concerns," not even the global context of "transnational regimes of exploitation."
Another broad effect of this meta-narrative has been a critical reflection on the role of anthropology in a world characterized by increasing interconnections which bring the so-called exotic into the everyday and vice versa (Ahmed and Shore 1995b, Fox 1991b) . In particular, the relevance of the traditional form of anthropological fieldwork, in which ethnographers study culturally and usually spatially distant people by going to live among them for an extended period, may be questioned given that similar experiences are available to more adventurous and well-heeled tourists and vicariously accessible via electronic media to many others. While I agree fully with Englund and Leach that ethnographic knowledge based in critical reflexivity provides a qualitatively different standard of validity and intellectual responsibility, I am less sanguine about their apparent preference for ethnography in localized sites. Certainly sites which "are not well linked to the forces of time-space compression" must not be ignored. Yet clearly they are becoming less common, and it would be folly to tie anthropology and its ethnographic research practices too closely to such a context. I would prefer to see the reflexive realist ethnographic perspective they advocate extended to less traditional field sites and unconventional topics, especially to sites that are not localized or clearly bounded spatially.
I contend that the hallmarks of ethnographic practice can be applied in such non-traditional "sites." Specifically, such research should be characterized by, first, long-term and intensive involvement with a collectivity-although this may have to be accomplished through more sporadic contact than is typical of a village-based ethnography, as for example with elite collectivities that have the resources to control access to their spaces and activities. Nevertheless, there are important ethical as well as intellectual reasons, recognized at least since the 1960s (Hymes 1972), for developing ethnographic research in such sites. (In emphasizing this characteristic of good ethnographic research, I obviously share the authors' concern about the way in which current conditions of academic work militate against such long-term involvement.) And second, ethnographic practice should incorporate a thoroughgoing reflexivity at various levels but particularly one in which ethnographers recognize that they are themselves transformed through their research and include such transformations as an integral part of their knowledge-seeking practices for understanding others' social and cultural contexts. 
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My reading of the chief argument in Englund and Leach's provocative and detailed article is that they are worried that a concern with sociological analyses of modernity, with its emphasis on commodification, individualization, and disenchantment, might be leading anthropologists to smuggle in ethnocentric concepts even as they struggle to reformulate Western understandings of modernity. The authors believe that the only way to prevent this from happening is to re-engage reflexively with longterm fieldwork in particular localities. Their ethnographic materials present interesting examples of counterintuitive "readings" of cultural Others' encounters with stereotypically "modern" and "Western" institutional forms: money and the commodity form in Papua New Guinea and evangelical Christianity in Malawi.
I will raise three sets of questions about this paper that focus in turn on ideas of context and locality, on understandings of the relation of modernity to Otherness, and on the continued relevance of long-term "local" fieldwork.
Englund and Leach make the important point that ethnographers should not assume prior knowledge of the context that they are studying. They fear especially that narratives of modernity supply anthropologists with certain discourses about the "larger" context that may be used uncritically. They thus strike an important cautionary note. However, their critique is built on a notion of "the local" that is problematic, especially in that it does not respond to the challenges mounted by the very critics, such as Appadurai, with whom they find fault.
The central point here is that one cannot assume, as anthropologists have been wont to do, that "the local" is its own universe, a geographically circumscribed space where meanings are made, where the most important social interactions occur, where economic and affective life is lived, and where social structures are reproduced. Nor is it adequate to employ spatial imagery in which "the local" is part of a "larger" world that encloses and encompasses it. One popular image (although a host of other similar ones exist) is that of a series of concentric circles in which "the local" is the innermost circle, surrounded by circles representing the region, the nation, and the global, with arrows pointing to lines of influence and flows across them. In fact, the authors give us "local" contexts that belie such a frame, contexts saturated with the actions of national states, national and transnational media, global political economies, and histories of colonialism. But they then fall back on the fiction that the locations they study are localities, without adequate reflection on what makes them so. One of the consequences is that their ethnographic subjects emerge as collective actors: thus Rai Coast villagers all seem to share certain notions of wealth and personhood and Pentecostals in a Malawian township all share certain ideas of the individual. Do such ethnographic moves bring us back to ideas of "a culture" that emphasized "the shared understandings" of its people? This is precisely the view of locality that the modernist ethnographers whom Englund and Leach criticize have so successfully brought into question, and it is somewhat surprising that their challenges have not been taken into account.
The lack of attention to differentiation brings me to my second point about the relationship posited by the authors between modernity and Otherness. Do understandings of wealth and commodities on the Rai Coast or constructions of personhood in Malawi differ according to age, gender, class, social position, migration history, and occupation? Englund and Leach's point that other people may construct contexts differently from the ethnographer relies on a dichotomy between the contexts constructed by Others and by anthropologists. The assumption is that these contexts are naturally different because Others do not think like ethnographers. But what if the ethnographer is a "native"? It is highly unlikely that no one on the Rai Coast or in the Malawian township studied by Englund was intimately familiar with "modernist" discourses about money, commodities, and persons and able to occupy more than one cultural framework or to translate between different understandings. It is even likely that all of the people in those different areas participated in uneven and contradictory ways in modernist discourses and utilized them in some way in making sense of their own worlds. It is hard to visualize how their respective encounters with colonialism, modernizing states, and global markets would have left them with modes of understanding and explanation that were not radically changed. Thus, when Englund and Leach insist that Other people may have different ways of delineating "wider" contexts from the ethnographer, how do they account for the fact that the understandings of "the natives" themselves are complex, hybrid phenomena interweaving different strands of lived experience no less than the ethnographer's? That some natives might share more with the white ethnographer than with other natives? That the axes of similarity and difference may not run uniformly through communities and geographical locations? I think their point about differences in conceptualizing contexts relies on a notion of difference that could be interrogated further, a difference that they appear to think lies awaiting discovery through "close" ethnographic encounters with cultural Others.
What is wrong with this picture of reflexive fieldwork? I am skeptical that one can attack the organizing assumptions of the discipline simply by being more reflective in the production of anthropological knowledge, while reproducing the dichotomies of Self and Other, (white) ethnographer and native informant, and modern social science and indigenous knowledges. Neither the bridge of empathy nor that of the vulnerability of the ethnographer or the practice of letting people define the contexts of their own practices is sufficient without a more radical revision of the terms in which we understand what anthropology is and what it does, to whom and by whom, and through what kinds of power relations. What would happen to Englund and Leach's analysis if one did not assume that the ethnographer came (as they did) from a different social world from his informants? Or if one assumed that the informants shared much with the ethnographer even as they differed from him? Or that the primary axis of difference across which the anthropologist was working was not "culture" but race, class, age, gender, or sexuality? One place where they do their own cause injustice is in unfairly characterizing the proponents of a reconceptualized ethnography as those who believe that "long-term and localized fieldwork has had its day." Interestingly enough, this sentence does not cite any particular proponent of this view. I was left wondering why the authors run "longterm" and "localized" together. Can one do "long-term" research that is multisited or that follows a particular group of people rather than being situated at one location or focuses on institutions that are geographically dispersed? Do the authors rule out the possibility of good ethnographic work done on temporary sites such as refugee camps and work camps for migrant laborers, which by definition cannot be long-term? (For detailed exploration of this theme, see Gupta and Ferguson 1997.) I trust that the questions and criticisms I have offered will be taken in the spirit in which they have been offered-as a way of inviting further dialogue and discussion rather than as a rejection of the authors' positions, which I find challenging and creative. I share the authors' enthusiasm about the need for longterm intensive fieldwork to produce valuable knowledge, as well as their concern not to subordinate ethnography to one or another meta-narrative. But I contest their view that much current anthropological work-including mine-is "organized by the meta-narrative of modernity" and that this obstructs the production of anthropological knowledge, for instance, with regard to Pentecostalism in Ghana.
Englund and Leach suggest that anthropologists employing the notion of modernity carry a certain bias into their fieldwork and merely reproduce preconceived views rather than engaging in "reflexive knowledge production." In so doing they not only caricature anthropologists like myself but also assume a particular hierarchical relationship between theoretical concepts and the practice of research in which the latter is completely subsumed under the former. This is not at all, however, the way I and others criticized by them use the notion of modernity. For me, engaging with modernity is a critical endeavour that calls for a phenomenological approach and hence a dialectical relationship between theoretical reflexion and research in which each is continuously examined in each other's light. Hence, for me "modernity" raises a host of fruitful questions rather than providing pre-given answers. I consider "modernity" productive for my work because the notion enables me to get beyond a view of cultures as separate, bounded entities standing by themselves (without, however, losing sight of cultural specificity), to consider the history of encounters between Western colonial agents and local people from a critical perspective beyond the modernization paradigm, to take into account actual global entanglements and similarities in postcolonial conditions (the "wider contexts" alluded to by Englund and Leach are of course not abstractions on the part of social scientists but lived-in realities), and to develop a shared language which makes possible comparison between different cases as well as debate among social scientists. In my view, sound fieldwork and theoretical reflexion in the light of "modernity" do not exclude each other, and I do not see how anthropology can proceed by emphasizing only the former. This is not to say that "modernity" has to remain part and parcel of anthropological discourse forever-it is certainly important to discuss its usefulness (albeit not in the rather unproductive terms set by Englund and Leach). The point is that in my view good anthropology will always be inspired by and at the same time challenge theoretical concepts. Nothing can be gained by isolating ourselves from debates in the social sciences and retreating into our discipline's "old concerns" with fieldwork.
In the section on Pentecostalism, the authors seriously contest my work on Pentecostalism in Ghana. They in-troduce me as a researcher who simply conflates African Pentecostalism with modernity and casts her research findings in pre-given terms, thereby overlooking what really matters to the people studied. This is a complete misrepresentation of my approach. Far from simply placing Ghanaian Pentecostalists in the mould of "modernity," my work is characterized by long-term encounters with Ghanaian Pentecostalists, on the one hand, and a critical Auseinandersetzung with thinkers on "modernity" such as Marx, Weber, and Habermas, on the other. What has struck me so much in Ghanaian Pentecostal discourse is the strong emphasis placed on the wish to be "modern," to "make a complete break with the past," to be "in control of oneself," etcetera. All these are statements made by the people concerned, not things I made up. Yet at the same time-and Englund and Leach are silent about this in their criticism of my work-people keep on talking about all the things which impede the dream of "being modern," things they subsume under the image of the Devil (for an elaboration of this point, see Meyer 1999). The main point I make about Pentecostalism is not that it is a harbinger of modernity but that it offers people a space and a discourse for reflecting upon the pitfalls, if not the impossibility, of the project of modernity and for embodying precisely that which they otherwise seek to leave behind. In fact, I became interested in the notion of "modernity" because the people among whom I conducted my research kept on talking in the terms stated above, and my work seeks to appreciate how their views of modernity differ from, for instance, Habermas's notion of rupture (Meyer 1998b) or Marx's notion of commodity fetishism (Meyer 1998c). I am more than surprised that Englund and Leach fail to recognize this. Moreover, I am struck by the fact that they use Englund's findings on Malawi to criticize my work on Ghana. Why should Pentecostalism in these two contexts be the same? I have never suggested that my work on Ghana would apply to the whole of Africa, and I find it fascinating to see how the Malawian situation differs from what I encountered in Ghana. In my view, it is important to appreciate the different trajectories of Pentecostalism in different contexts rather than seeking to criticize the findings pertaining to one context with those generated in a considerably different one. 
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Having long since set themselves up quite nicely by pluralizing the notion of culture, anthropologists are now hard at work putting the "s" on "modernity." Yet despite the comforts of relying on such a well-rehearsed diversifying maneuver, the authors of this timely and stimulating article worry over this second pluralization. In particular, they fear that it will erase the gains of the first by smuggling in a universalizing meta-narrative that makes modernity at its core everywhere the same. Anthropologists, they argue, regularly treat modernity as an "invariable" set of ruptures in ideas about such things as exchange, production, and personhood. Local modernities thus always consist in the ways people adopt, contest, or otherwise live with the effects of these ruptures.
What troubles the authors in all this is their sense that anthropologists are increasingly allowing theories of modernity to stand in for ethnographic detail in characterizing the way people understand modern versions of exchange, production, personhood, etc. The suggested antidote to this turn away from the ethnographic record is, of course, to do more careful ethnography and to be ready to use what is learned thereby to interrogate universalizing theories of modernity. This strikes me as a plea for good anthropological practice, and as such it is a welcome intervention in the contemporary discussion of multiple modernities.
But in an article that so forcefully promotes the value of ethnography, it is also important to look at the ethnographic material the authors present. And it is here that I find myself unsettled. What is revealed in the ethnography here is that once one has defined the metanarrative of modernity as a story about ruptures, the ethnography ranged against that meta-narrative must work to prove nothing but continuity. Hence, in the material from Papua New Guinea, whites turn out to be nothing more than an avatar of traditional types of potentially productive "others" such as affines and the dead. Similarly, Malawian Pentecostals whose lives are guided by the Holy Spirit are really no different from traditional healers, whose personhood is also a composite of "spiritual and human agencies." As in many models of syncretism, the names have been changed but the real story is one of continuity.
Making a fetish of continuity strikes me as at least as dangerous as going whole hog for the modern meta-narrative of rupture. Indeed, in contrast to the way the authors see the discipline's approach to modernity and change, I think that anthropologists are more likely to try to explain change away than they are to confront it either through the meta-narrative of modernity or through some other analytic lens (Robbins 1998). In accounting for this difference in perspective, I note that it sometimes seems that the Comaroffs and their students stand in here for all anthropology. This synecdoche may explain why the authors see the rupture meta-narrative everywhere while I do not (Englund 1996 is more straightforward on this point). In any case, I want to conclude by suggesting two problems that arise when one sets out to solve the ethnographic equation primarily for continuity.
First, if change or rupture did occur, how would we know? This question is trickier than it looks. This is especially so when we assume that "traditional" categories are always primary and more meaningful, such that we cannot imagine that affines and the dead are in any sense now kinds of whites but must instead assume that the relation runs the other way round. Unless we take new ideas as seriously in their own terms as we take old ones in theirs, as for example Foster (1995) does to good effect in Melanesia, we will find continuity even when local people do not see it as the most interesting game in town.
And that raises the second problem: what kind of ethnography do we produce when the people we study are themselves committed to rupture or to "the sense of possibilities which the unincorporated foreign stimulates" (Siegel 1997:147)? There is certainly no shortage of works that handle this situation by telling us that while the people discussed see themselves as leading new lives, the trained observer can easily see that tradition still patterns what they do (e.g., Gnecchi-Ruscone 1977; Burt 1994:253-54) . Is this preferable to the multiple-modernists' trick of branding witchcraft a "mystification"? Or is it a similar kind of ethnographic refusal? Given what I know of Papua New Guinea and of Pentecostal Christianity, I would be surprised if the people of the Rai Coast or the Pentecostals of Lilongwe did not have their own ideas about change and rupture, their own projects that valorized transformation and worked to remake some aspects of their world. It is by working to understand these projects, the various temporal and spatial contexts they posit, and the constraints they face that we can best construct an ethnography of modernities. This article opens a theoretical space for this kind of research, and it is for that important work, rather than for the way its ethnographic examples imply uncomplicated cultural continuity, that it deserves to be widely read.
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Englund and Leach justly criticize a widespread penchant in contemporary anthropological writing for a "metanarrative of modernity," a conceit they characterize as aimed at preserving ethnography's traditional focus on local particularities while at the same time locating such particularities within "wider contexts" of globalization. They argue that employing this meta-narrative obstructs realization of the methodological virtues of ethnographic "reflexivity." Their illustrative discussions of fieldwork in Malawi and Papua New Guinea show that identifying what wider "contexts" are in fact locally relevant requires an open-(and, implicitly, local-) mindedness precluded by such meta-narrativizations. Fieldworking ethnographers must allow the subjects of study to enter into defining what these contexts are. In these terms, the paper is both convincing and useful; it gently but trenchantly calls into serious question some of the most influential studies and trends on today's anthropological scene, and it laments the reward system of academic institutions for undermining the discipline's authentic virtues.
But, of course, there is always more to say. I shall organize my comments along two dimensions-first, with reference to the critique of the meta-narrative(s) of modernity and, second, with reference to just what sort of more general (if not "meta-") framings might be proposed to locate the local and particular in the "wider" and the "general" or "comparative."
Englund and Leach hit the nail on the head in pointing out how exaggerated conceptions of "modernity's" discontinuities, its radical ruptures not only with the past but with "non-Western" or traditional lifeways, contribute to locating all effective historical agency or causation in metaphysically conceived "wider" forces like "individualization," "commodification," or "globalization."
This essentialization of what constitutes the anthropologically "relevant" becomes not only a cover for "ethnographic ignorance," as they argue, but also (it seems to me) a warrant for theoretical ignorance. In many of the writings they criticize, emphases on the rapidity of movements of people and information in today's world, associated with a decline of spatially bounded communities and an alleged decline of the nation-state-the end of "society" if not "culture" as anthropology has known it-are wedded to the notion that such circumstances obviate anthropological theories developed with reference to the presumably no longer relevant realities of the "bounded" communities and cultures of the past. Radically new worlds require radically new "theories." In other words, it is not only the discipline-defining method of ethnography that is at stake but social theory-the conceptual tools with which we attempt to comprehend social life. One finds little evidence, however, of compelling retheorizations other than the mainly descriptive meta-narratives themselves. My point is that the "meta-narrative of modernity" is not social theory but postures as one, and it does so in a way that erases the history of anthropological theory and converts ignorance of this history into an academic virtue.
Still, as Englund and Leach are aware, one must avoid being misread to suppose that globalization and modernization are not important social realities that call for comprehension. There are important distinctions to be made among studies that employ "modernity" as explanation or cause for local realities and those that analyze in careful sociological terms the changes that accompany economic integration, technological transformation, education, and so forth. In this regard, Englund and Leach might have said more about how ethnography and anthropological theory might contribute in more general and comparative terms to understanding modernity. I would argue that anthropology must draw from its rich historical repertoire as social theory as well as from ethnographic reflexivity to treat of "multiple modernities" as local social realities to be explained rather than merely as local responses to "wider" metacausal, teleological forces. In other words, I agree that world-systems theory and especially the romantically tinged, sometimes apocalyptic rhetoric of radical rupture characterizing many of the studies they criticize are anthropologically inadequate, but the next step ought to be to address the realities of "wider contexts" in a more compelling way.
This latter observation leads me to my only substantial query: The article leaves somewhat vague just how what I have just termed social theory might relate to meta-narrative. In some quarters, social theory itself is derided as "meta-narrative," condensing a totalizing but neurotic ambition that betrays the theorizer's self-serving will to power. Englund and Leach claim that they are not opposed to meta-narrative in general (only the specific meta-narrative of modernity); they recognize that one cannot engage in fieldwork in the absence of preconceptions; they affirm that variation cannot coherently be represented in the absence of something that is invariable; and they avow the value of comparative work. Yet the article leaves the impression that somehow "reflexive ethnography" and "social realism" suffice to provide the basis for such comparison. "Reflexivity" as characterized here amounts to the giveand-take of learning about the world; one must constantly modify one's preconceptions as the resistance constituted by reality imposes its own form of discipline. Meta-narratives of modernity refuse to accommodate these realities, assimilating the world to their preconceptions. "Reflexivity," in these terms, strikes me as boiling down to something quite close to scientific method, and I applaud Englund and Leach for so defining it.
Left out of consideration, however, are the complex processes embedded in the history of anthropology that have led to the emergence of what I have termed social theory. Among anthropology's mandates ought to be the task of theory building-developing conceptualizations of social and cultural processes at a level of abstraction sufficiently general to make sense in comparable terms not only of vastly differing societies but also of the complex local and global realities so portentously proclaimed by anthropology's would-be pundits. In sum, I agree wholeheartedly with Englund and Leach that the rhetoric of novelty and crisis that characterizes meta-narratives of modernity obstructs the production of anthropological knowledge, but in response it is important to affirm not only reflexive ethnographic method and a belief in social reality but also the necessity of "reflexively" produced theory.
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It appears to some of our commentators that by questioning the meta-narratives of modernity we merely privilege continuity. One instance seems to be our insistence on the utility of localized fieldwork in the production of anthropological knowledge. This, Davies and Gupta fear, subscribes to an obsolete research tradition in which anthropologists define their "field" as a locality which has its own sociocultural universe. Our interest in localized fieldwork, however, has nothing to do with a spatial definition of the anthropologist's field. To assume that localized fieldwork presupposes a spatially demarcated locality is to ignore our focus on relationships. As we state in the article, our interest is in how "a particular setting, through which flow many currents, provides a standpoint from which to address issues of scale in a way that generalizing perspectives do not." The township in Lilongwe and the villages on the Rai Coast hardly appear as isolated entities in our accounts. People's relationships in these two settings span spatial boundaries and provide insights into the workings of relations of radically different scales.
It follows that we can agree with Gupta-and with Appadurai, whom he cites-that the local is not its own universe and that localized fieldwork is not the only methodological strategy which sociocultural anthropologists may follow. We made the point about places which are not well linked to the technologies of time-space compression for a political purpose-these places too merit attention of a reflexively informed kind, especially if they appear to have imported both the hopes and the despair of the project of modernity. But this does not mean that they are the only places to be studied or that geographically dispersed institutions and such temporary sites as refugee camps fall outside the scope of anthropological inquiry. Our related political intervention was to point out that long-term and localized fieldwork is becoming less feasible within the institutional framework of academic anthropology. This, in turn, encourages the production of instant ethnography based on short-term visits to various sites.
Our main objective, however, was less to compare the virtues of localized and multisited fieldwork than to draw attention to certain unreflexive uses of the notion of modernity in ethnography. Robbins's comment unfortunately illustrates the difficulties in such a reflexive enterprise. Whereas Davies and Gupta suspect that we promise undesirable continuity in methodology, Robbins feels that we emphasize continuity in our case studies to the point of not seeing any ruptures at all. It is not, however, the idea of rupture per se that we object to but the interpretation of specific experiences as examples of the ruptures that characterize modernity. Our aim is to establish that other ruptures exist for the people we write about, not to prove "continuity" as the alternative to rupture. The rupture between white people and Rai Coast villagers is a pertinent concern both in the narratives presented and in the history to which these narratives speak. Pentecostal Christians in Lilongwe experience a profound spiritual rupture in their second birth. But Robbins means to cast a more fundamental doubt over our approach. He accuses us of wanting to find continuity so that we can claim the primacy of "traditional concepts." Yet we pointed out that the concepts defined in the sociological discourses on modernity may not be primary. There is, in short, no fetish made of continuity in our argument, as there is no fetish made of the locality. Tradition and continuity, of course, belong to the very meta-narratives we criticize. They necessarily evoke their counterparts-modernization and change.
It is revealing that although Robbins identifies two moments of pluralization in current anthropology e n g l u n d a n d l e a c h Ethnography and Meta-Narratives of Modernity F 245 -"cultures" and "multiple modernities"-he does not reflect on how the second pluralization depends on the first. The notion of "multiple modernities" is supposed to counter the assumption that the locality is its own universe, but it does nothing to examine the real culprit-the notion of cultures in the plural. Both notions, in effect, sustain the predilection of modernist observers for classification and taxonomic organization which increase entities (individuals, groups, societies, cultures, culture areas) in proportion to the scale of analysis. Our understanding is that the social world is continuous and, as Gupta implies, the Other can be anyone and everyone. The great promise of ethnography is precisely comparison and not merely juxtaposition, a point which we illustrated with the coevalness of Melanesian "others" and the new reproductive technologies. At the same time, while we accept Gupta's point about different subject positions in any given social field, we also contend that the question of difference must be debated in relation to specific historical conditions. Insecurity such as that faced by township dwellers in Lilongwe and villagers on the Rai Coast may well cause a coherence of views around interpretations which make sense of experience.
We share Sangren's view that the meta-narratives of modernity do not qualify as social theories, but we admit puzzlement over what he calls "theory building." Does not our contribution indicate the risks involved in producing "social theory" that is disembedded from ethnographic practice? This is not an argument against all theory but a recognition of the fact that anthropological knowledge does not arise in a vacuum. At least two central issues in current social theory-personhood and contextualization-received attention in our article. Moreover, as Meyer's comment demonstrates, the sociological discourses on modernity appear to many anthropologists precisely as ways of attaching one's contributions to the broadest field of social sciences. We never doubted that such anthropologists find the notion of modernity "fruitful" because it allows them to represent, for example, Pentecostalism in Ghana and Malawi as different and yet to view both as instances of modernity as it is defined in current social scientific thinking. It would indeed be a "caricature" of those anthropologists' work if we denied their analytical quest for understanding difference and variation, a charge which we regard as unfounded in Meyer's comment. As we argued in the article, one does not dissociate oneself from a meta-narrative simply by continuing to use familiar notions in a critical way. It is the invariable underpinnings of variations that must be addressed.
Meyer sees the danger in our approach that we isolate ourselves from the social sciences. This reminds us of the dichotomy between "modern social science and indigenous knowledges" in Gupta's comment. It is not our dichotomy, because our desire is to elaborate reflexive ethnography in which ethnographers and their interlocutors are partners in the production of anthropological knowledge. Why assume, for example, that Rai Coast villagers are not engaged in a version of social science-in an analysis of white people and their economic, political, and religious relations through questions posed to Leach about triple-six money or through rituals which attempt to capture the essence of alien political institutions? Our approach is to comment upon and revise analytical notions through a reflexive engagement with the lived realities of sociocultural life. An anthropology which goes beyond seeking and representing "separate bounded entities" is the enterprise we are engaged in. It is for this reason that we attempt to take as seriously the contributions of our interlocutors as those of the theorists of modernity.
